“Client released on bail by Court of Appeal after spending almost 1 year in jail on murder charges.” [COMMENTS BY RICHARD NEARY]

R. v. B___

Between
Regina, Respondent, and
K R D B___, Applicant
And between
Regina, Respondent, and
G B___, Applicant

[2009] B.C.J. No. 2294

2009 BCCA 431

71 C.R. (6th) 81

2009 CarswellBC 3115

Dockets: CA037383; CA037384

British Columbia Court of Appeal
Vancouver, British Columbia

M.A. Saunders, D.F. Tysoe and E.A. Bennett JJ.A.

Heard: October 1, 2009.
Oral judgment: October 7, 2009.

(40 paras.)

 

Criminal law — Compelling appearance, detention and release — Judicial interim release or bail — Grounds for denial — Review of — Appeal by two accused from refusal to grant them bail pending trial allowed — Appellants were brothers; together with their father they were charged with second degree murder of KT — Both appellants had history of failing to comply with court orders — Judge held that detention of first appellant was necessary to ensure his attendance in court, and that detention of both appellants was required on tertiary ground — Judge overlooked that first appellant had surrendered himself into custody — Surrounding circumstances were not of such an exceptional nature as to require appellants' detention on tertiary ground.

Appeal by two accused from decisions refusing to grant them judicial interim release pending trial. The appellants were brothers and were charged along with their father with the second degree murder of KT. KT had been in a struggle with the father. The brothers prevented others from interfering with the struggle. KT was then transported by the father to the police station, where KT was found to be dead. The brothers, K and G, surrendered themselves to police two days after the events giving rise to these charges. The judge was not satisfied that the appellant K would attend court if released and held that his detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. With respect to the appellant G, the judge held that his detention was required to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. G had a significant history of failing to attend court on previous occasions. G had a drug problem and the judge was not confident that his family would have the ability to supervise him and to ensure compliance with any terms of release. K also had a history of failing to attend court appearances.

HELD: Appeal allowed. The appellants were to be released on surety of $100,000. The judge overlooked the fact that K had surrendered two days after his father's arrest. The surrender, without flight, was an acknowledgement by both appellants that they, along with their father, were prepared to be dealt with according to the law and bore in their favour on the primary ground. The fact that K had surrendered to the police, coupled with the new evidence of the efforts at rehabilitation made while in detention, the nearness of the trial date, and the strong involvement of the family (including the fact that his father would also be on trial for second degree murder), persuaded the court that K had met the primary ground. The judge had erred in his approach to the tertiary ground by focusing upon aspects of the appellants' non-compliance with court requirements, although finding, at least as to G, that those defaults did not necessitate his detention to ensure attendance in court. Even accepting the judge's view that the case against the appellants was strong, the surrounding circumstances were not of such an exceptional nature as to require the appellants' detention prior to their trial to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515(10), s. 515(10)(a), s. 515(10)(b), s. 515(10)(c), s. 680(1)

Appeal From:

On appeal from: Supreme Court of British Columbia, December 17, 2008 (R. v. B___, Western Communities No. 14124-2-C)

Counsel:

Counsel for the Applicant, K. B___: R.L. Neary.

Counsel for the Applicant, G. B___: L.D. Marshall.

Counsel for the (Crown) Respondent: C. Rogers.

 


Oral Reasons for Judgment

     The judgment of the Court was delivered by

1     M.A. SAUNDERS J.A. (orally):-- Two brothers, K R D B___ and G B___, are before us on a review of orders of the Supreme Court of British Columbia pronounced December 17, 2008 refusing them judicial interim release pending trial. Chief Justice Finch has directed the review pursuant to s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code:

    • 680.(1) A decision made by a judge under section 522 or subsection 524(4) or (5) or a decision made by a judge of the court of appeal under section 261 or 679 may, on the direction of the chief justice or acting chief justice of the court of appeal, be reviewed by that court and that court may, if it does not confirm the decision,
      • (a)   vary the decision; or
      • (b)   substitute such other decision as, in its opinion, should have been made.

2     For the reasons that follow, I am of the view the review must be allowed, and a decision substituted for each applicant allowing him judicial interim release on terms I shall address at the conclusion of these reasons.

3     I shall refer to the applicant K B___ as K B___ Jr. or K Jr.

4     The applicants are charged, together with their father K B___ Sr., with second degree murder in the death of K.T. on May 30, 2008. The father K B___ Sr. was granted bail on an earlier occasion.

5     Because the applicants are charged with second degree murder, the burden lay upon them in the Supreme Court of British Columbia hearing, to show cause why detention in custody is not justified. Section 515(10) of the Criminal Code establishes the grounds upon which detention is justified:

    • 515 (10) For the purposes of this section, the detention of an accused in custody is justified only on one or more of the following grounds:
      • (a)   where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in court in order to be dealt with according to law;
      • (b)   where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public, including any victim of or witness to the offence, having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice; and
      • (c)   if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including
        • (i)    the apparent strength of the prosecution's case,
        • (ii)   the gravity of the offence,
        • (iii)  the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used, and
        • (iv)  the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves, or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or more.

6     With respect to K B___ Jr., Mr. Justice Johnston held that Mr. B___ failed to satisfy the ground set out in s. 515(10)(a), referred to as the primary ground, that is the learned judge was not satisfied that the applicant's detention was not necessary to ensure his attendance in court. He held that K B___ Jr. had satisfied s. 515(10)(b) that is, he concluded that the applicant's detention was not necessary for the protection or safety of the public. Last, the judge held that the applicant's detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, that is, the applicant had not satisfied him on s. 515(10)(c), referred to as the tertiary ground.

7     With respect to G B___, the judge held the applicant's detention was not necessary to ensure his attendance in court, and was not necessary for the protection or safety of the public. That is, the judge was satisfied G B___ had met the burden of demonstrating his detention was not necessary under either s. 515(10)(a) or (b). However, he held that G B___'s detention in custody was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice - s. 515(10)(c) - the tertiary ground.

8     This matter, coming before us pursuant to s. 680(1), is in the nature of an appeal on the record, not a hearing de novo. In R. v. Wu (B.Q.), 117 B.C.A.C. 305, 40 W.C.B. (2d) 295, Mr. Justice Cumming for the court described our function:

    • [6] A review under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code is in the nature of an appeal on the record and not a hearing de novo. While the reviewing court exercises an independent discretion and may substitute its own opinion for that of the single judge under review, it must base its review on facts found by the single judge's evaluation of the evidence. It is not necessary that a reviewing court, before intervening, come to a conclusion that the decision of the single judge under review was unreasonable or that an error in principle was committed. See R. v. D.S.H. (1991), 2 B.C.A.C. 309.

9     Although the review proceeded primarily on the basis of the materials filed in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, the applicants filed with us, with the agreement of Crown counsel, documents attesting to their efforts, while in detention, to address their addictions and to complete their high school diplomas.

10     The applicants and the Crown refer to the reasons for committal issued by Provincial Court Judge Palmer establishing the factual underpinning of the allegations. As they contend the judge failed to properly consider the events surrounding their arrest, it is necessary to describe the factual underpinning of the charges in general terms. There is, of course, restrictions on the publication of the information that derives from the Provincial Court proceedings.

11     The deceased had been released from prison a few days prior to his death. On the day of his death he was at a drug house, and in possession of a hand gun. At some point K B___ Jr. attended at the residence. There was an encounter. The deceased directed K B___ Jr. to return with his father.

12     K B___ returned with his father, K B___ Sr. and his brother G B___. There was a confrontation, and a struggle. The deceased had his gun removed. Following the physical confrontation the deceased was put into the back seat of the pick-up truck in which the B___s had arrived, and was driven by K B___ Sr. directly to the RCMP station. K B___ Jr. and G B___ left their father some time before his arrival at the police station and went to a private residence.

13     Soon after arrival at the police station it was determined K.T. was deceased. Cause of death was determined to be asphyxia due to external compression of the neck.

14     K B___ Sr. was arrested and charged with second degree murder. The applicants learned soon after the arrival of their father at the police station that K.T. was dead. They surrendered themselves to the police two days later and were charged with second degree murder and assault.

15     Mr. Justice Johnston described the case against the applicants in these terms:

    • [20] With the caveat in mind, I consider, from what I have been told, that the Crown's case is reasonably strong. I say that in that it seems clear that Mr. B___ Sr. caused the injuries that led to [K.T.'s] death. It seems clear on the information that the fatal injuries were caused in a flight between Mr. B___ Sr. and the deceased [K.T.]. It is reasonably clear that Ken B___ Jr. was present throughout that encounter between his father and [K.T.], and there is evidence that Ken B___ Jr. acted to prevent others from interfering in that struggle.
    • [21] There is also evidence that G B___ joined the fray but at a later point during the struggle and that he also acted to prevent others from entering into the struggle.
    • [25] I bear in mind that the information I have been provided supports an argument that Mr. B___ Sr. was the principal actor, at least in the events that led to [K.T.'s] death. That would arguably put G B___ in the category of a party to the murder.
    • [26] K B___ Jr. seems to share the same status insofar as the murder charge is concerned but, from what I have been told, appears to be the principal actor in the courts alleging assault with a weapon with G B___ an arguable party to those offences.

16     The judge then addressed the application of s. 515(10) to the two applicants, first G and then K Jr. Addressing the primary ground in relation to G B___, the judge observed that the applicant had a significant history of failing to attend court on previous occasions, including five missed appearances between May and September 2007 on a charge of assault on which a stay of proceedings was later entered, failing to attend in court while under subpoena, failing to appear on April 23, 2008, on a charge of driving while prohibited, committing an offence while on a conditional sentence order with a curfew, and failing to report to his sentence supervisor.

17     The judge referred to the submission made on behalf of G B___ that the defaults in his compliance with court requirements was the product of his addiction to illegal drugs, and expressed scepticism of the family's ability to supervise him and to ensure compliance with any terms of release. He then noted the narrow ambit of s. 515(10)(a) and held that although it was a close matter, he was satisfied "given the support of the family" that detention of G B___ is not necessary to ensure his attendance in court.

18     However, on the tertiary ground, that his detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, the judge said:

    • [44] I note that the factors set out in subsection (c) of s. 515(10) are not exhaustive and that it is permissible to consider all of the circumstances when considering whether or not the tertiary ground has been satisfied.
    • [45] All of those circumstances come back to what I have described, I think, as G B___'s very unfortunate history of non-compliance with court orders and his unfortunate history in attending when required to do so.
    • [46] The tertiary ground, I repeat, reads "if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice." The regime providing for judicial interim release, or bail, prior to trial is part of the administration of justice, and that must have the confidence of the public.
    • [47] A fair-minded person, having been reminded of the presumption of innocence, informed of the rights to bail contained in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, having been educated in the principles underlying the judicial interim release provisions of the Criminal Code, and aware that at the time of the events giving rise to these charges G B___ had a deplorable history of attendance in court when required to do so, a deplorable history of failing to comply with directions or conditions of the court, and that at the time of these events he was still bound by a conditional sentence order, it having apparently been extended by his intervening offences and breaches, that person, it seems to me, would lose confidence in the administration of justice were G B___ released.
    • [48] So I am not satisfied by G B___ that his detention is not necessary in order to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, and his application is accordingly denied.

19     Having reached his decision on G B___, the judge turned to K Jr. Like G, K B___, Jr. has a history of failing to attend court appearances. The judge, however, distinguished K B___ Jr. from G, and found K Jr. had not met the primary ground set out in s. 515(10)(a). He said:

    • [5] K B___ Jr. has the same access to the same supportive family and the same sureties as G. There is one difference, and that is, K B___ Jr. has had surety bail in the past and has been rendered by his surety. He was still at large months later when these offences were charged. That factor militates against confidence that if released he would attend in court as required even if a surety were ordered.
    • [6] Primarily for that reason, I am not satisfied that K B___ Jr.'s detention is not necessary to ensure his attendance in court as necessary, and he fails on the primary ground.

20     As well the judge concluded K B___ Jr. had not satisfied the tertiary ground in s. 515(10)(c):

    • [7] I will deal with the tertiary ground however. I will not repeat what I have said about the four factors outlined in s. 515(10). The considerations apply with equal force to K B___ Jr. as they did to G B___.
    • [8] I would have concluded that K B___ Jr. had failed to satisfy me that his detention was not necessary in order to maintain confidence in the administration of justice had I been required to go to the tertiary ground. I repeat here that the regime providing for judicial interim release prior to trial is part of the administration of justice that must have confidence of the public, and again, a fair-minded person, reminded of the presumption of innocence, informed of the rights to bail in the Charter, educated in the principles underlying judicial interim release provisions of the Criminal Code, and aware that at the time of the events giving rise to these charges of K B___ Jr.'s history of failing to appear in court when required, that he was subject to a warrant for his arrest, and was bound by a condition that he have no contact with his brother G, would lose confidence in the administration of justice if K B___ Jr. were released on bail.

21     It is convenient for me to reverse the order chosen by the judge and to address first the application of K B___ Jr. His counsel observes that K B___ Jr., had no criminal history until 2008, at about which time he fell into a serious drug addiction, an addiction that prompted the sorry history of compliance with court requirements referred to by the judge. He observes that history was not as extensive as was G's history, and even on the factors considered by the judge, did not justify his conclusion the primary ground was not met, especially as the judge concluded in G's case that the primary ground was met. More importantly, he submits that notwithstanding the bail history, the judge overlooked the fact K B___ Jr. Surrendered into custody. This, he contends, is a powerful fact supporting K B___ Jr. on the primary ground, as illustrating an intention to have the matter resolved through the court process, but is a fact that was ignored, or possibly even used to support his detention.

22     Further, K B___ Jr.'s counsel refers to the new evidence which demonstrates, he says, that the deplorable failure of K Jr. to observe court requirements while he was in the grip of his addictions is unlikely to be repeated. Combined with the strong support of his family, and their willingness to put some of their financial strength at risk by acting as surety, we are urged to conclude his detention is not necessary to ensure his attendance in court.

23     Crown counsel disputes the submission the judge failed to appreciate the significance of the fact of the surrender, and refers to the reference made by the judge to the fact the brothers surrendered as demonstrating the judge considered the fact of surrender not only in relation to the primary ground in respect to K B___ Jr., but in relation to the tertiary ground as it applied to both applicants.

24     In the issue of surrender the judge said:

    • [27] Another relevant factor to me on the primary ground is that although Mr. B___ Sr. went immediately to the police station with Mr. Taylor in his truck, neither G nor K went with him. Instead, they seemed to have gone to the home of an acquaintance.
    • [28] G and K Jr. surrendered themselves to police two days after the events giving rise to these charges.
    • [4] As I have said earlier, he did not go with his father to the police station on the day the charges arose but, instead, went to the home of an acquaintance.

25     With respect, it does appear to me the fact K B___ Jr. surrendered two days after his father's arrest was disregarded by the judge in considering the primary ground. The surrender, without flight, is an acknowledgement by both applicants that they, alongside their father, were prepared to be dealt with according to the law and bears in their favour on the primary ground.

26     The fact K B___ Jr. surrendered to the police, coupled with the new evidence of the efforts at rehabilitation made while in detention, the nearness of the trial date, and the strong involvement of the family including the fact his father will also be on trial for second degree murder, persuades me K B___ Jr. has met the primary ground in s. 515(10)(a) of the Criminal Code.

27     The judge found as well neither applicant satisfied the tertiary ground. As can be seen from the reasons I have replicated, this conclusion, for each applicant, was based largely on their poor history of complying with court requirements.

28     On behalf of each applicant it is said this reasoning is in error, and impermissibly expands the proper factors that may be considered under s. 515(10)(c), contrary to direction from the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Hall, 2002 SCC 64, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, 167 C.C.C. (3d) 449. Hall considered the decision of Mr. Justice Hall in R. v. MacDougall, 1999 BCCA 509, 138 C.C.C. (3d) 38, and in turn was considered by this Court, first by Mr. Justice Esson in R. v. Patko, 2003 BCCA 262, then by Madam Justice Levine in United States of America v. Graham, 2004 BCCA 162, 195 B.C.A.C. 245, and last by Madam Justice Rowles in R. v. Bhullar, 2005 BCCA 409.

29     In Hall Chief Justice McLachlin, addressing the contention of s. 515(10)(c) was overbroad and thus unconstitutional, confirmed that use of the tertiary ground will rarely arise:

    • [27] Public confidence is essential to the proper functioning of the bail system and the justice system as a whole: see Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, at p. 689. Indeed, public confidence and the integrity of the rule of law are inextricably intertwined. As Hall J.A. stated in MacDougal, supra, at p. 48:
    • To sustain the rule of law, a core value of our society, it is necessary to maintain public respect for the law and the courts. A law that is not broadly acceptable to most members of society will usually fall into desuetude: witness the unhappy prohibition experiment in the United States. Courts must be careful not to pander to public opinion or to take account of only the overly excitable, but I believe that to fail to have regard to the provisions of s. 515(10)(c) in the relatively rare cases where it can properly be invoked would tend to work against maintaining broad public confidence in the way justice is administered in this country. [Emphasis added.]

She said further:

    • [40] Section 515(10)(c) sets out specific factors which delineate a narrow set of circumstances under which bail can be denied on the basis of maintaining confidence in the administration of justice. As discussed earlier, situations may arise where, despite the fact the accused is not likely to abscond or commit further crimes while awaiting trial, his presence in the community will call into question the public's confidence in the administration of justice. Whether such a situation has arisen is judged by all the circumstances, but in particular the four factors that Parliament has set out in s. 515(10)(c) -- the apparent strength of the prosecution's case, the gravity of the nature of the offence, the circumstances surrounding its commission and the potential for lengthy imprisonment. Where, as here, the crime is horrific, inexplicable, and strongly linked to the accused, a justice system that cannot detain the accused risks losing the public confidence upon which the bail system and the justice system as a whole repose.
                • [Emphasis added.]

30     In Bhullar Madam Justice Rowles performed a thorough review of the application of the tertiary ground and said:

    • [46] The analysis in the foregoing passages in Hall, which was directed to a constitutional challenge to s. 515(10)(c) based on s. 11(e) of the Charter, makes it abundantly clear that a determination as to whether pre-trial detention is necessary in order "to maintain confidence in the administration of justice" in the circumstances of a particular case must be made within the strictures delineated by the Chief Justice.
    • [47] The proposition that denial of bail on the basis of the tertiary ground will be exceptional finds support in the decision of Esson J.A. granting interim release to the accused in R. v. Patko, 2003 BCCA 262, [2003] B.C.J. No. 1012. In that case, the accused was charged with second degree murder in a case in which the victim had died as a result of head injuries inflicted by baseball bats. In elucidating the exceptional nature of the circumstances required to justify detention on the tertiary ground, Esson J.A. stated, at para. 14:
      • It is of some significance that the Chief Justice of Canada, in giving judgment for the majority [in Hall], agreed with the statements of Mr. Justice Hall of this Court in R. v. MacDougal (1999), 138 C.C.C. (3d) 38 to the effect that the application of the tertiary ground will be relatively uncommon. The facts in MacDougal and those in R. v. Hall were both considerably more serious than those in this case in terms of being capable of affecting public confidence in the administration of justice should the accused person be released pending trial. It is particularly relevant that, because R. v. Hall was a murder case, there is a direct basis for comparison.
    • [60] In my respectful view, the hearing judge's brief analysis of the tertiary ground does not accord with the constitutional constraints discussed by the Chief Justice in Hall. In relation to the tertiary ground, McLachlin C.J. made clear that s. 11(e) of the Charter does not permit Parliament to confer a broad discretion on judges to deny bail; rather, s. 515(10)(c) must be considered having regard in particular to the four enumerated factors set out in that subparagraph. Moreover, the court must be satisfied that detention is not only advisable but necessary and necessary not just to any goal, but to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.
    • [61] Further, the analysis must be made from the perspective of a reasonable and informed member of the public. As noted by McEachern C.J.B.C. in R. v. Nguyen, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2121, supra, at para. 18, and referred to with approval in Hall, the reasonable person making this assessment must be one properly informed about "the philosophy of the legislative provisions, Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case." The Charter values include the presumption of innocence and the recognition of the importance of bail to the proper administration of justice.
    • [62] Assuming the primary and secondary grounds are met, the denial of bail on the tertiary ground will be exceptional ...

31     In this case the reasons of the hearing judge focus the decision upon aspects of the applicants' non-compliance with court requirements, although finding, at least as to G B___, those defaults did not necessitate his detention to ensure attendance in court.

32     In my respectful view, this approach to the tertiary ground does not accord with the approach of Chief Justice McLachlin in Hall, as applied by this Court in the cases I have discussed. To ground a decision on the tertiary ground upon such factors is to step beyond the narrow application of s 515(10(c) upon which the finding of its constitutionality was based.

33     The question then is whether, on this review, given the findings of fact of the judge, we consider the applicants have established detention is not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

34     The analysis that is required of this question is from the perspective of a reasonable and informed member of the public, informed as to the role of bail to the proper administration of justice.

35     In my view this is not one of those 'relatively uncommon' cases, to borrow words of Mr. Justice Esson, in which the tertiary ground should apply. Even accepting the judge's view that the case against the applicants is strong, a view they contest, it seems to me the surrounding circumstances are not of such exceptional nature as to require the detention of the applicants, prior to their trial, to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

36     For these reasons I conclude grounds for the detention of the applicants is not established. An order for release, on appropriate terms, should be made for each applicant.

37     D.F. TYSOE J.A.:— I agree.

38     E.A. BENNETT J.A.:— I agree.

39     M.A. SAUNDERS J.A.:-- The question is the terms upon which these two should be released.

(submissions by counsel)

40     M.A. SAUNDERS J.A.:-- The terms of the release of each applicant shall be as follows. They shall be released on surety of $100,000, one or more, not to preclude the mother, Marie B___, acting as surety for more than one accused if otherwise justified. These are the terms:

      • 1.  The Applicant shall keep the peace and be of good behavior.
      • 2.  The Applicant shall report within twenty-four (24) hours of his release from custody, in person, to the Bail Supervisor, 200 - 1756 Island Highway, Colwood, British Columbia, and thereafter he shall report as and when directed by the Bail Supervisor and in any event not less than once per week in person.
      • 3.  The Applicant shall reside at [ ] Victoria, British Columbia, and shall not change his address without first obtaining the consent of the Court.
      • 4.  When first reporting to the Bail Supervisor, the Applicant shall provide his phone number to the Bail Supervisor and he shall not change that phone number without first advising the Bail Supervisor.
      • 5.  The Applicant shall obey all rules and regulations of his residence.
      • 6.  The Applicant shall remain within the Province of British Columbia.
      • 7.  The Applicant shall remain within the property upon which his residence is located at all times, except he may leave his residence between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. as follows:
          • (a)  while in the company of his mother, Marie B___;
          • (b)  while in the company of his counsel; or
          • (c)  while in the company of another adult person approved in writing by the Bail Supervisor.
      • 8.   The Applicant shall present himself at the door of his residence when any Peace Officer or Bail Supervisor attends there for the purpose of determining his compliance with this Order.
      • 9.   The Applicant shall respond personally and immediately to the phone when any Peace Officer or Bail Supervisor makes a phone call to his residence for the purpose of determining his compliance with this Order.
      • 10.  The Applicant shall not leave Vancouver Island, British Columbia, except with the permission of the Court or the written permission of the Bail Supervisor.
      • 11.  The Applicant shall abstain from communicating, directly or indirectly, and shall have no contact, with [28 named persons], except as follows:
        • (a)  through legal counsel, or
        • (b)  while in attendance at court and within the courtroom.
      • 12.  The Applicant shall not attend at or be within fifty (50) meters of any place which he knows to be the residence, school or workplace of any of those persons mentioned in condition 11, except while on a highway in a moving motor vehicle.
      • 13.  The Applicant shall not possess or consume any alcohol or any controlled substance as defined in Section 2 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, except as prescribed for him by a Physician.
      • 14.  The Applicant shall not enter any liquor store, beer and wine store, bar, pub, lounge or other business premise where the primary commodity sold is liquor.
      • 15.  The Applicant shall not possess any pipe, syringe or other drug paraphernalia.
      • 16.  The Applicant shall register the number of any cell phone, pager or portable telecommunication device with the Bail Supervisor.
      • 17.  The Applicant shall not possess any weapon as defined in Section 2 of the Criminal Code, and he shall not reside in a home where any other person keeps or stores any such weapon.
      • 18.  The Applicant shall forthwith surrender for safekeeping to the West Shore RCMP Detachment any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance in his possession, together with any authorization or registration certificate for any such item. Except for purposes of making delivery to the West Shore RCMP in accordance with this condition, he shall not possess any of the listed items and he shall not reside in a home where any other person keeps or stores any such item.
      • 19.  The Applicant shall not possess any knife except for the purpose of preparing or eating food.

M.A. SAUNDERS J.A.

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